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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Government must detain 
noncitizens who are removable because they committed certain 
specified offenses or have connections with terrorism, and it 
must hold them without bond pending their removal 
proceedings.  This appeal asks us to decide what process is due 
when such detainees contend that they are not properly 
included within § 1226(c) and whether noncitizens who have 
substantial defenses to removal on the merits may be detained 
under § 1226(c).  Because the District Court granted relief in 
the form of a class-wide injunction, we must also decide 
whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) permits class-wide injunctive 
relief. 
 
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the 
District Court that § 1226(c) is constitutional even as applied 
to noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal.  But 
for those detainees who contend that they are not properly 
included within § 1226(c) and are therefore entitled to a 
hearing pursuant to In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 
1999), we hold that the Government has the burden to establish 
the applicability of § 1226(c) by a preponderance of the 
4 
 
evidence and that the Government must make available a 
contemporaneous record of the hearing, consisting of an audio 
recording, a transcript, or their functional equivalent.  Because 
we also conclude that § 1252(f)(1) does not authorize class-
wide injunctions, we will reverse the District Court’s order in 
part, affirm in part, and remand for the entry of appropriate 
relief. 
 
I. Factual & Procedural Background 
 
This case returns to us following our 2016 remand to the 
District Court to consider class certification.  See Gayle v. 
Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Because our prior opinion related the history of the case 
to that point in detail, see id. at 300–02, we will recount it only 
briefly here. 
 
In 2012, Garfield Gayle and Neville Sukhu filed a 
habeas petition on behalf of a putative class of noncitizens who 
are detained under § 1226(c) in the District of New Jersey.1  
Contending that it violates due process to mandatorily detain 
noncitizens who have substantial defenses to removal and that 
the procedure for conducting Joseph hearings is 
constitutionally inadequate, they sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief on behalf of the putative class. 
 
In 2015, the District Court granted partial summary 
judgment in favor of Gayle and Sukhu individually and then 
denied their class certification motion as moot.  Gayle v. 
 
1 A third named plaintiff, Sheldon Francois, is no longer 
a party in this matter. 
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Johnson, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 402–03 (D.N.J. 2015).  On 
appeal, however, we determined that because Gayle and Sukhu 
themselves had been released from detention before the 
District Court granted relief, it was their individual claims that 
were moot.  Gayle, 838 F.3d at 300.  That meant the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of those 
individual claims but retained jurisdiction over the class 
certification motion that was filed while the named plaintiffs 
were still in custody.  Id. at 303–04.  We therefore remanded 
for the District Court to determine if the purported class should 
be certified and, if so, to address the class claims.  Id. at 312–
13. 
 
On remand, the parties engaged in limited discovery 
regarding class certification, and the District Court certified a 
class consisting of: 
 
all persons within the District of New Jersey, 
now and in the future, who are mandatorily 
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) [and 
who seek] to obtain a bond hearing on the basis 
of a substantial claim to relief that would prevent 
the entry of a removal order, which includes 
challenging the constitutionality of the Joseph 
hearing process, namely, the allocation of the 
burden of proof and the contemporaneous 
recording of the hearing. 
 
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., No. 12-cv-




 The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The record developed in those 
proceedings highlights what is at stake for the plaintiff class 
(hereinafter “Plaintiffs”).  As of 2017, there were nearly 1,200 
detainees in New Jersey held under § 1226(c), at least 20% of 
whom were Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs).  JA 308, 
318, 442.  Among cases that concluded in 2017, the average 
time of detention was 300 days, with a median of 224 days, and 
some § 1226(c) detainees were held for more than a year.  JA 
308, 318, 442–43.  In addition, of those cases in New Jersey 
that concluded in 2017, 41% of § 1226(c) detainees raised a 
defense to removal—either by challenging the Government’s 
removal charge or by applying for discretionary relief—and 
55% of those detainees ultimately prevailed.  JA 308, 318. 
 
 After considering this record, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to the Government in part and to the 
Plaintiffs in part.  Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. 
Inst., No. 12-cv-2806, 2019 WL 4165310, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 
3, 2019).  It ruled that § 1226(c) may apply to noncitizens who 
have substantial defenses to removal on the merits without 
violating due process and that the Government need not make 
a contemporaneous record of Joseph hearings.  Id. at *12, *24.  
But it agreed with the Plaintiffs that the standard of proof 
currently applied at Joseph hearings is “virtually undefined” 
and places too much risk of error on § 1226(c) detainees.  Id. 
at *19.  Thus, even though the Government took the position 
that Joseph requires it to make an initial showing of “probable 
cause” to believe a detainee committed a relevant offense 
under § 1226(c), id. at *19, the District Court “issue[d] a class-
wide injunction that directs the Government to establish [at the 
Joseph hearing] that there is probable cause to find that a 
detained alien under § 1226(c) falls under the statute’s 
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mandatory detention requirements,” id. at *2.  It thereby 
rejected the Plaintiffs’ contentions that probable cause is too 
low a standard and that noncitizens may not be subjected to 
§ 1226(c) detention if they raise “substantial challenges to 
entry of a final removal order.”  Appellants’ Br. 5. 
 
 With the District Court having denied their due process 
claims concerning the standard of proof at Joseph hearings, the 
applicability of § 1226(c) to detainees with substantial 
defenses to removal, and the requirement for a 
contemporaneous record of Joseph hearings, the Plaintiffs 
appealed.2 
 
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Although the named plaintiffs’ individual claims “were long 
ago moot,” Gayle, 838 F.3d at 302–03, the certified class has 
standing to litigate its claims and the named plaintiffs may 
continue to represent the class so long as they meet the 
requirements of Rule 23, which the District Court found they 
did, see Gayle, 2017 WL 5479701, at *19; Holmes v. Pension 
Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135–36 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 
We review the District Court’s summary judgment 
decision de novo.  Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 
943 F.3d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 
2 The Government initially cross-appealed as well, but 






In 1996, during a comprehensive revision of the 
immigration laws, Congress enacted § 1226(c), which requires 
the Government to detain noncitizens who are removable on 
the basis of certain crimes or connections with terrorism and to 
hold them without bond until their removal proceedings.  See 
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2019); Demore v. Kim, 
538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003).  Under Joseph, such detainees 
are entitled to a hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) to 
determine “whether the [Government] has properly included 
[them] within a category that is subject to mandatory 
detention” under § 1226(c).  22 I. & N. Dec. at 805; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D), (h)(2)(ii).  If a detainee is found not to 
be “properly included” within § 1226(c), she may then seek 
release on bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).3  Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. at 806. 
 
3 With narrow exceptions, § 1226(c) provides: 
 
The Attorney General shall take into custody any 
alien who— 
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having 
committed any offense covered in section 
1182(a)(2) of this title, 
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed 
any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), 
(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, 
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) 





Plaintiffs challenge § 1226(c) detention and the Joseph 
hearing framework on three grounds: (A) that it violates due 
process to apply § 1226(c) to noncitizens who have substantial 
defenses to removal; (B) that the Government at Joseph 
hearings must establish the applicability of § 1226(c) by a 
standard greater than “probable cause”; and (C) that due 
process requires the Government to make a contemporaneous 
verbatim record of Joseph hearings.  Defending the form of 
relief entered by the District Court, Plaintiffs also argue (D) 
that § 1252(f)(1) authorizes district courts to enter class-wide 
injunctions.  We address these issues in turn. 
 
 
the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of 
imprisonment of at least 1 year, or 
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) 
of this title or deportable under section 
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title . . . . 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
For its part, § 1226(a) provides, as relevant here, that 
“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may 
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the 
alien is to be removed from the United States” and that 
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) and pending such 
decision, the Attorney General . . . may release the alien on . . . 
bond.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
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A. The constitutionality of § 1226(c) as applied to 
noncitizens with substantial defenses to removal 
Plaintiffs first argue that § 1226(c) is unconstitutional to 
the extent it requires detention without bond for those 
noncitizens who have “a substantial defense to entry of a 
removal order,” Appellants’ Br. 22–23—whether the defense 
be a claim for discretionary relief, such as cancellation of 
removal or adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), (b)(1), 
1255, or that the noncitizens is not deportable or is not 
inadmissible, for example, because she did not commit a 
removable offense, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1182.  Plaintiffs 
derive their “substantial defense” approach from the context of 
bail pending appeal, where a defendant may be released if she 
“raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result” in 
her prevailing, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B), and where a 
“substantial question” is defined as one that is “fairly 
debatable” by “‘jurists of reason,’” United States v. Smith, 793 
F.2d 85, 88–89 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 
U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).  So, Plaintiffs posit, if a detainee 
raises one of these defenses to removal4 and the merits are 
 
4 To the extent Plaintiffs are arguing that mandatory 
detention is impermissible for noncitizens who claim they did 
not commit “one of the [removal offenses] specified in 
[§] 1226(c),” Appellants’ Br. 21, Plaintiffs challenge not the 
constitutionality of § 1226(c) as applied to those with 
substantial defenses to removal, but rather the adequacy of the 
process by which detainees may contest whether they are 
“properly included” within § 1226(c), i.e., the Joseph hearing, 
see Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 805.  We address that issue in 




fairly debatable, that detainee cannot constitutionally be 
subjected to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). 
   
As we read the case law, however, that argument, has 
been foreclosed by the Supreme Court.  In Demore v. Kim, the 
Court assessed the constitutionality of mandatory detention 
under § 1226(c) against the due process test from Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which requires that immigration 
detention “bear[] a reasonable relation to the purpose for which 
the individual was committed,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 527 
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).  It concluded that 
§ 1226(c) passes muster under that standard, explaining that 
the “detention of deportable criminal aliens pending their 
removal proceedings” advances Congress’s goal of 
“preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or 
during their removal proceedings” and thus “increas[es] the 
chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully 
removed.”  Id. at 527–28 (second emphasis added).  By its 
terms, this reasoning reflects that the Court understood 
§ 1226(c) to cover even those noncitizens who are ultimately 
successful in opposing removal. 
 
Plaintiffs try to distinguish Demore on two grounds, 
neither of which is persuasive.  First, they say that because the 
detainee in Demore did not “argue that he himself was not 
‘deportable’ within the meaning of § 1226(c),” id. at 522 & n.6, 
we should follow dicta from the Seventh Circuit and treat 
Demore as “le[aving] open the question whether mandatory 
detention under § 1226(c) is consistent with due process when 
a detainee makes a colorable claim that he is not in fact 
deportable,” Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 
(7th Cir. 2004).  But the Supreme Court in Demore expressly 
noted that the detainee there “did not concede that he will 
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ultimately be deported” because he had “applied for 
withholding of removal.”  538 U.S. at 522 n.6. 
 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that § 1226(c) detention does 
not “bear[] a reasonable relation” to Congress’s goal of 
“preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing,” id. at 
527–28, when the noncitizen has a substantial defense to 
removal because such individuals are less likely to abscond.  
But any lower likelihood of flight is conjectural, and even if 
we accept Plaintiffs’ proposition, they do not explain why 
mandatory detention would not bear a “reasonable relation” to 
a lesser but still extant likelihood of flight.  Id. at 527.  
Demore’s rationale—that § 1226(c) detention is permissible 
because it “increas[es] the chance that, if ordered removed, the 
aliens will be successfully removed,” id. at 528 (emphasis 
added)—therefore governs this case. 
 
Were there any doubt, the Supreme Court has observed 
in the years since Demore both that § 1226(c) requires the 
Government to “detain an alien until ‘a decision on whether the 
alien is to be removed’ is made,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 
S. Ct. 830, 847 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)), and that it 
mandates that such noncitizens “be detained without a bond 
hearing until the question of their removal is resolved,” Preap, 
139 S. Ct. at 959 (emphasis added). 
In sum, the mandatory detention of a noncitizen does 
not offend the Due Process Clause—even where she has a 
substantial and ultimately successful defense to removal—so 
long as she falls within the scope of § 1226(c) “by reason of 
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having committed any of the [specified] offenses.”5  See 
Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28. 
 
B. The burden and standard of proof at Joseph 
hearings 
We next examine the process that is due at the hearing 
before an IJ to determine whether a detainee is “properly 
included” within the scope of § 1226(c), i.e., the Joseph 
hearing.  Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 805.  Because the detainee 
in Demore did not take advantage of the opportunity for a 
Joseph hearing, the Supreme Court there “ha[d] no occasion to 
review the adequacy of Joseph hearings generally in screening 
out those who are improperly detained pursuant to § 1226(c).”  
Id. at 514 n.3.  As Justice Kennedy observed, however, “due 
process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at 
least some merit to the [Government’s] charge” that a 
noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), 
 
5 Although Plaintiffs press the point, we have no 
occasion to consider the canon of constitutional avoidance both 
because the text of the statute is unambiguous, see Jennings, 
138 S. Ct. at 846 (“[Section] 1226(c) makes clear that detention 
of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision on 
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.’”  
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a))), and because we find no 
constitutional problem with § 1226(c) under Demore’s 
rationale, cf. id. at 842 (“When a serious doubt is raised about 
the constitutionality of an act of Congress, it is a cardinal 
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the 




id. at 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and for the reasons set 
forth below, we are persuaded that the Joseph hearing 
framework does not provide this surety. 
 
Under Joseph, the Government must establish merely 
that there is “reason to believe” a detainee is properly included 
within § 1226(c), at which point the burden shifts to the 
detainee to show that the Government is “substantially unlikely 
to prevail on its charge” at the eventual removal hearing.  
Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 807.  A detainee can make that 
showing with either factual or legal arguments, but her burden 
is a heavy one:  Her legal arguments, for example, may only 
succeed if she presents “precedent caselaw directly on point 
that mandates a finding that the charge of removability will not 
be sustained.”  In re Garcia, 2007 WL 4699861, at *1 (BIA 
Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished).6 
 
6 The BIA has explained that even where “[t]he 
respondent’s brief on appeal raises serious questions 
concerning whether the respondent’s offense is appropriately 
categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude” because the 
detainee raised a precedential circuit court decision 
interpreting an analogous crime, such “serious questions” do 
not meet the “substantially unlikely” standard at the Joseph 
hearing stage.  In re Zamoripa-Tapia, 2010 WL 2390763, at *1 
(BIA May 21, 2010) (unpublished) (citing Navarro-Lopez v. 
Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007)).  And although 
unpublished BIA decisions such as Garcia and Zamoripa-
Tapia “do not bind the BIA” in future cases, see De Leon-




According to the Government and the District Court, so 
long as “reason to believe” equates to “probable cause,” this 
framework satisfies due process because the Joseph hearing is 
only preliminary and “[t]o impose a higher burden on the 
Government . . . would severely undermine the purposes of 
[§ 1226(c)].”7  Gayle, 2019 WL 4165310, at *21.  According 
to Plaintiffs, however, a probable cause standard incorrectly 
“allocate[s] the risk of error.”  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 423 (1979).  Instead, they argue, once again, that due 
process requires applying the standard used for bail pending 
appeal, where a defendant may be released if she “raises a 
 
illustrate how, in practice, the BIA has applied Joseph to “those 
parties for whom [those decisions were] rendered,” id. at 350. 
 
7 In practice, the “reason to believe” standard has 
produced significant confusion.  Indeed, the District Court 
issued its class-wide injunction requiring the Government to 
meet a “probable cause” standard precisely because it found 
“reason to believe” to be “virtually undefined” and 
“inconsisten[tly]” applied.  Gayle, 2019 WL 4165310, at *18–
*19.  Although it is “often equated with mere probable cause,” 
In re Lopez-Cornejo, 2011 WL 585622, at *2 (BIA Jan. 31, 
2011) (unpublished), and the Government here agrees that 
“reason to believe” is the same as “probable cause,” see Gayle, 
2019 WL 4165310, at *19; Appellees’ Br. 12, it is susceptible 
to being viewed as a standard of proof distinct from, and lower 
than, “probable cause,” see Amy Greer, Giving Joseph 
Hearings Their Due: How to Ensure that Joseph Hearings 





substantial question of law or fact likely to result” in her 
prevailing.  18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B).  Adopting that 
framework for Joseph hearings would mean that a detainee 
would be subject to the ordinary bail standards of § 1226(a) 
whenever there is a “substantial question” whether she is 
properly included within § 1226(c).  Appellants’ Br. 31–32.8  
At a minimum, however, Plaintiffs urge us to hold that the 
Government must make an initial showing by a 
“preponderance” of the evidence that the detainee is properly 
included within § 1226(c).  Tr. 11–12. 
 
To determine the proper burden and standard of proof, 
we “engage[] in a straight-forward consideration of the [due 
process] factors identified in [Mathews v.] Eldridge.”  Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).  We balance (1) “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  “The function of a 
standard of proof,” the Supreme Court has explained, “is to 
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our 
society thinks he should have in the correctness” of the 
 
8 This approach is not without support:  Justice Breyer 
advocated a substantial question standard for Joseph hearings 
in his dissent in Demore, see 538 U.S. at 578 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting), as did Judge Tashima in his concurrence in Tijani 




decision, so it “serves to allocate the risk of error between the 
litigants.”  Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Applying the Mathews test, we conclude that the 
Government bears the burden of proof at Joseph hearings and 
that it must establish that a detainee is properly included within 
§ 1226(c) by a preponderance of the evidence.  We reach this 
conclusion for three reasons. 
 
First, the loss of liberty for § 1226(c) detainees is a 
particularly weighty interest, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 
cf. B.C. v. Att’y Gen., — F.4th — , No. 19-1408, 2021 WL 
3891557, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2021), and when such a severe 
deprivation is at issue, the Government must bear the burden 
of proof, see German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. 
Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Addington, 
441 U.S. at 431–33 (requiring the Government to show clear 
and convincing evidence of mental illness before imposing 
civil commitment); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992) (“The State may also confine a mentally ill person if it 
shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is 
mentally ill and dangerous.”  (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 
The Joseph framework, however, effectively shifts the 
entire burden of proof onto the detainee.  Even though Joseph 
encouraged IJs to engage in “more than just a perfunctory 
review and ratification of the fact that the [Government] may 
have had a ‘reason to believe’ the respondent was [within the 
category of § 1226(c)],” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 804–05, the low 
threshold it imposes and its burden-shifting paradigm mean, in 
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practice, that the detainee must disprove § 1226(c)’s 
applicability.  It is no surprise then that the BIA itself has 
sometimes acknowledged that under Joseph, “the burden of 
proof is upon the respondent to establish that he is not properly 
included” within § 1226(c).  In re Garcia, 2007 WL 4699861, 
at *1 (BIA Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished). 
 
Second, the “probable cause” standard advocated by the 
Government is too low a bar given the interests at stake.  
Probable cause is less than a preponderance, see Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 121 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444–45 
(4th Cir. 2012), and although it must be based on “more than 
bare suspicion,” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 
(1949), a “reasonable ground for belief” will suffice, id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and it “does 
not demand any showing that [the] belief [in question is] 
correct or more likely true than false,” Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983).  Thus, under that standard, a noncitizen 
may be deemed to fall within § 1226(c) simply if “a man of 
reasonable caution” could “belie[ve]” that the noncitizen 
committed a relevant offense, even if that belief appears more 
likely false than true.  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
But the deprivation for § 1226(c) detainees is not only 
severe in nature, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; it is also 
substantial in duration.  If a noncitizen is found to fall within 
§ 1226(c), she may not seek release on bond unless and until 
her detention has become “unreasonably long,” which, under 
our precedents, may be six months or more.  German Santos, 
965 F.3d at 210–11.  The class representatives here, for 
example, were held for nearly a year and for nearly two years, 
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respectively, and § 1226(c) detainees in New Jersey are held 
for an average of 300 days and a median of 224.  Detention of 
that length without the opportunity to seek release on bond 
must be based on more than just “a reasonable ground for 
belief.”  Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
Indeed, while suspected parole violators may be 
detained pending a final parole revocation hearing on a finding 
of mere probable cause, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 487 (1972), they have a diminished liberty interest 
compared with § 1226(c) detainees, because parole 
“[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty 
to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional 
liberty properly dependent on the observance of special parole 
restrictions,” id. at 480; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.  
Likewise, in the context of bail pending trial, see generally 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987), although a 
rebuttable presumption of dangerousness or flight risk arises if 
a judge finds “probable cause to believe that the [defendant] 
committed” certain specified offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), 
see United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113–15 (3d Cir. 
1986), the presumption of dangerousness or flight risk under 
§ 1226(c) is in effect irrebuttable once a detainee is found to be 
“properly included” within that provision, Joseph, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. at 805.  Compared to those two guideposts, we conclude 
that the Government must meet a higher standard than probable 
cause here. 
 
Third, while the “probable cause” standard places too 
little risk on the Government, Plaintiffs’ proposed standard 
places too much.  Under Plaintiffs’ proposed framework, 
borrowed from the context of bail pending appeal, raising a 
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“substantial question” about the applicability of § 1226(c) 
would defeat the Government’s showing and allow the 
detainee to seek bond under § 1226(a).  Reply Br. 9.  But, as 
we have explained, a “substantial question” is merely one that 
is “fairly debatable” by “‘jurists of reason,’” Smith, 793 F.2d 
at 89 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 
(1983)), and given the importance of the Government’s interest 
in “preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to 
or during their removal proceedings,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 
528, that low threshold would tilt the scales too far.9 
 
Having considered the standards urged by the 
Government and by Plaintiffs, we settle on one in between:  To 
comport with due process, the Government must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the detainee is properly 
included within § 1226(c) as both a factual and a legal matter.  
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24.  It must show, in other 
words, that it is more likely than not both that the detainee in 
fact committed a relevant offense under § 1226(c) and that the 
offense falls within that provision as a matter of law.  Cf. 
 
9 Similarly, although it is a “settled rule that when a 
party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the 
Government” to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard in 
the context of civil detention, German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213–
14, requiring the Government to make an initial showing of 
clear and convincing evidence that a detainee is properly 
included within § 1226(c) would be too high a bar at the Joseph 
hearing because it would effectively duplicate the burden the 
Government must meet at the eventual removal hearing to 
“establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the alien 
is deportable,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); see also Woodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966). 
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Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 809 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting) 
(contending that the Government must “demonstrate[] a 
likelihood of success on the merits of its charge” at the Joseph 
hearing). 
 
This approach properly places a lower burden on the 
Government at the Joseph hearing than at the removal hearing, 
see supra note 9, so it will not turn Joseph hearings into “mini-
trials” that duplicate the eventual removal hearing by 
“requiring a full assessment of the merits of an individual’s 
claims and defenses.”  Appellees’ Br. 40.  And requiring the 
Government to make an initial showing that a detainee likely 
“is inadmissible” or “is deportable” for one of the reasons 
specified in § 1226(c), see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D), is 
consonant with other detention contexts in which we require 
parties to make some initial showing of likelihood of success 
pending final adjudication, see, e.g., Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114; 
18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). 
 
In sum, the Government bears burden of proof at Joseph 
hearings, and it satisfies that burden by showing that a detainee 
more likely than not is properly included within § 1226(c). 
 
C. Whether the Government must create a 
contemporaneous record of Joseph hearings 
Having determined the proper burden and standard of 
proof at Joseph hearings, we turn to Plaintiffs’ final argument: 
that due process requires a contemporaneous verbatim record 
of Joseph hearings.  Mathews balancing again guides our 
analysis.  Both parties agree that the first Mathews factor—the 
“private interest” in freedom from custody, Mathews, 424 U.S. 
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at 335—is significant, so we are left to weigh the second and 
third Mathews factors. 
 
As for the second, the parties dispute “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation,” id., if the Government does not make 
a contemporaneous verbatim record of Joseph hearings.  
Plaintiffs assert such a record is necessary to deter, detect, and 
correct “IJ misconduct,” Appellants’ Br. 47 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted), while the Government retorts that 
because Joseph hearings “generally turn on legal questions” 
and the meaning of “conviction documents,” a 
contemporaneous verbatim record is unnecessary and the BIA 
can review the relevant documents and legal issues de novo, 
Appellees’ Br. 53, 58.   
 
Plaintiffs have the better argument.  Misconduct or 
mistakes made by IJs are often identifiable only through audio 
recordings or transcripts of the proceeds.  See Serrano-Alberto 
v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that 
“the record” from an immigration proceeding may indicate that 
an “IJ’s conduct crosse[d] the line”).  And as demonstrated by 
the record here, Joseph hearings do sometimes turn on witness 
testimony.  Even the Government’s designee, see Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 30(b)(6), Immigration Judge Robert D. Weisel, 
acknowledged at his deposition that detainees “will testify” at 
Joseph hearings and that such testimony “would lend itself to 
potentially . . . establishing” that the detainee is not properly 
included within § 1226(c).  JA 405, 417–18.  If a detainee 
testifies that she is not the person in the conviction records, for 
example, the IJ might “direct[] the government to take the 
fingerprints of the individual to determine identity.”  JA 424–
25.  The Government, too, Judge Weisel explained, “could 
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even produce testimony” to show that the detainee is properly 
included within § 1226(c).  JA 421. 
 
Currently, however, according to the Government’s 
Statement of Material Facts, “the only contemporaneous 
record” that is made of Joseph hearings is “generally . . . a form 
order with a box checked off,” although IJs often “maintain 
contemporaneous notes of proceedings.”  JA 317.  In the event 
a detainee appeals to the BIA, the IJ will then “prepare[] a 
written memorandum,” which might be based on the IJ’s notes 
and “any relevant audio recordings.”  Id.  But in the absence of 
any requirement to create such notes or recordings, id., the 
memo might be based on nothing more than an IJ’s best 
recollection—after the fact and amid innumerable other 
hearings over which she presided. 
 
Either way, such post-hoc reconstruction of the events 
will never be “the functional equivalent of a transcript.”  Singh 
v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1200, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(requiring the Government to create a contemporaneous record 
of bond hearings for § 1226(a) detainees whose detentions 
have become unreasonably prolonged).  So relative to the 
existing state of affairs, we easily conclude that the “probable 
value” of “additional . . . procedural safeguards” at Joseph 
hearings is high.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; cf. Press-Enter. 
Co. v. Superior Ct. Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 508, 
512 (1984) (explaining that for both “the accused and the 
public,” creation of and access to transcripts plays a crucial role 
in guaranteeing “the basic fairness” of proceedings and 




As to the “Government’s interest,” the third factor in the 
Mathews test, 424 U.S. at 335, we agree with the District Court 
that “the Government would bear no additional burden” if it 
were required to create a contemporaneous record, Gayle, 2019 
WL 4165310, at *23, because audio recording equipment is 
already installed in the hearing rooms where Joseph hearings 
occur, and it is often on by default.  In other words, IJs already 
operate that equipment during removal hearings, see JA 307–
08, 317, and in many cases must affirmatively turn it off before 
a Joseph hearing.  Allowing it to record instead would seem, if 
anything, to lighten the Government’s load. 
  
Given the substantial individual interest in liberty, the 
relatively high value of additional safeguards, and the minimal 
burden on the Government, Mathews balancing dictates that 
the Government make “a record [of Joseph hearings] of 
sufficient completeness” for “adequate and effective . . . 
appellate review.”  Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 
194 (1971) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).10  
 
10 Although Mayer was a criminal case, “the Due 
Process Clause applies to . . . aliens” within the United States, 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, and we have recognized “the 
importance of having an adequate record” for review in the 
context of agency decision-making and immigration 
proceedings in particular.  See Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r Labor, 
613 F.3d 87, 101 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Marincas v. Lewis, 
92 F.3d 195, 202–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring an adequate 
record in asylum proceedings); Kheireddine v. Gonzales, 427 
F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2005) (“While this case involves the 
failure of transcription in an immigration proceeding [not a 




This requirement does not, of course, “translate automatically 
into a complete verbatim transcript.”  Id.  Rather, “[a]lternative 
methods of reporting [the] proceedings are permissible” if they 
create “an equivalent report of the events,” such as “[a] 
statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative 
statement based perhaps on the [IJ]’s minutes,” or an audio 
recording.  Id. at 194–95 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The choice among those “functional 
equivalent[s] of a transcript” lies with the Government, but 
whatever the form, “the government must make available for 
appeal a contemporaneous record of [Joseph] hearings.”  
Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208–09. 
 
D. Whether § 1252(f)(1) permits class-wide 
injunctive relief 
Having determined that two of Plaintiffs’ constitutional 
arguments are meritorious, all that remains is to decide what 
relief may be granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) and whether 
 
same: due process demands a reasonably accurate, reasonably 
complete transcript, or an adequate substitute, to allow for 
meaningful and adequate appellate review.”  (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  In addition, 
“[i]mmigration law is a field in which fair, accurate factfinding 
is of critical importance,” B.C. v. Att’y Gen., — F.4th — , No. 
19-1408, 2021 WL 3891557, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept. 1, 2021) 
(quoting Calderon-Rosas v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 378, 381 (3d 
Cir. 2020)), and an adequate record enhances the ability to 
review factual claims made at Joseph hearings.  In light of 
those principles, we conclude that Mayer’s requirement of “a 
record of sufficient completeness,” 404 U.S. at 194 (citation 
omitted), extends to Joseph hearings as well. 
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the District Court erred by “issu[ing] a class-wide injunction” 
setting the standard of proof for Joseph hearings.  Gayle, 2019 
WL 4165310, at *2. 
 
Section 1252(f)(1) provides that “no court (other than 
the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to 
enjoin or restrain the operation of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232], 
other than with respect to the application of such provisions to 
an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part 
have been initiated.”  We have previously held that 
§ 1252(f)(1) “permit[s] class declaratory relief.”  Alli v. 
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1016 (3d Cir. 2011).  But we have not 
addressed whether it allows class-wide injunctive relief in the 
specific scenario at issue here: a class in which every member 
is “an individual alien against whom proceedings . . . have 
been initiated.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). 
 
We conclude it does not.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “[b]y its plain terms, and even by its title, 
[§ 1252(f)(1)] is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive 
relief” that “prohibits federal courts from granting classwide 
injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221–123[2].”  
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 
471, 481 (1999) [hereinafter AADC]; see also Nken v. Holder, 
556 U.S. 418, 431 (2009) (describing § 1252(f)(1) as “a 
provision prohibiting classwide injunctions against the 
operation of removal provisions”).  Of course, “[t]he Court in 
AADC did not consider . . . the application of § 1252(f)(1) to 
. . . a class” in which every member is an individual who is 
already in immigration proceedings, Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 
875 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and the Supreme Court, too, has 
treated that as an open question, see id. at 851 (majority 
opinion).  But as AADC suggests, the plain text of § 1252(f)(1) 
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bars class-wide injunctions because they necessarily “enjoin 
. . . the operation” of § 1226(c) “with respect to” more than just 
“an individual alien.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); see AADC, 525 
U.S. at 481.11 
 
We therefore join the Sixth and Tenth Circuits in 
holding that § 1252(f)(1) prohibits class-wide injunctions even 
where the class is composed entirely of individuals who are 
already in removal proceedings.  See Hamama v. Adducci, 912 
F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2018); Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427, 
433 (10th Cir. 1999).  But see Padilla v. Immigr. & Customs 
Enforcement, 953 F.3d 1134, 1151 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated on 
other grounds by Immigr. & Customs Enforcement v. Padilla, 
141 S. Ct. 1041 (2021).  Accordingly, the District Court erred 
in entering a class-wide injunction here, and we will vacate that 
order and remand for the entry of the appropriate declaratory 
relief under Alli.  See 650 F.3d at 1016.12 
 
11 Plaintiffs cite Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 
(1979), which held that “[t]he fact that [a] statute speaks in 
terms of an action brought by ‘any individual’ . . . does not 
indicate that the usual Rule providing for class actions is not 
controlling,” id. at 700.  But Califano concerned who could 
bring a claim, holding that individual claims can be aggregated 
in class actions, id., while § 1252(f)(1) concerns the scope of 
relief that can be granted and bars injunctions that affect “the 
application” of § 1226(c) “with respect to” more than just “an 
individual,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1).  Califano is thus inapposite. 
 
12 At oral argument, Plaintiffs asserted that although 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment order in part, reverse in part, vacate 
the entry of injunctive relief, and remand for the entry of 
appropriate declaratory relief. 
 
§ 1252(f)(1), it is not a jurisdictional statute, so the 
Government could—and in Plaintiffs’ view did—forfeit its 
§ 1252(f)(1) argument by failing to cross-appeal.  As a general 
matter, Plaintiffs are correct that “a party aggrieved by a 
decision of the district court must file an appeal in order to 
receive relief from the decision,” United States v. Tabor Court 
Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1991), and that there 
is a distinction to be made between “the question whether there 
is jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy” and “[t]he nature 
of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches,” Avco Corp. 
v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968); see also Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998); Swift 
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331 (1928); United States 
v. Hart, 983 F.3d 638, 642 (3d Cir. 2020).  Here, however, our 
adoption of a preponderance standard in lieu of a probable 
cause standard expands Plaintiffs’ rights relative to the District 
Court’s order, so the Government may raise § 1252(f)(1) to 
defend against that expansion even in the absence of a cross-
appeal.  See Morley Const. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 
185, 191 (1937); cf. Tabor Court Realty, 943 F.2d at 342. 
